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Should Separate Property Gradually Become
Community Property as a Marriage Continues?
J. Thomas Oldham*
I. INTRODUCTION

"Community property" states do not always apply identical
rules to determine the rights of spouses when a marriage ends.
Indeed, as I have recently shown, there are some significant
differences among these states.' However, all of them adhere to the
distinction between separate and community property. Premarital
acquisitions by a spouse and property acquired by one spouse
during marriage by gift or inheritance are separate property, and
acquisitions during marriage due to the effort of either spouse are
community property. The spouses each have a 50% interest in each
item of community property from the moment of acquisition;
separate property is solely owned by the acquiring spouse. At
dissolution the community estate is shared, but separate property is
not, regardless of the length of the marriage. 2 Separate property
remains separate, as long as it is segregated from other property,
and the parties do not change title or sign a written agreement to
change its character.
This distinction between premarital acquisitions and gifts or
inheritances by one spouse and acquisitions during marriage due to
effort has also been accepted by a majority of the non-community
property U.S. states as the guiding principle for how property
should be dealt with upon divorce. "Separate property" is not to be
divided, while "marital property" is shared.3
Copyright 2011, by J. THOMAS OLDHAM.
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1. See J. Thomas Oldham, Everything is Bigger in Texas, Except the
Community Property Estate: Must Texas Remain a Divorce Haven for the
Rich?, 44 FAM. L.Q. 293 (2010).
2. The sole exception to this rule is Washington, where separate property
can be divided at divorce. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West,
Westlaw current through Aug. 2011 amendments).
*

3.

See generally J. THOMAS

OLDHAM,

"Property" and

"Marital

Property," in DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY

§

5.03, at 5-9 (2010). Professor O'Brien states that "community-property
standards are increasingly predominant in divorces occurring in separateproperty [non-community property] states." Raymond C. O'Brien, Integrating
MaritalProperty into a Spouse's Elective Share, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 688
(2010) (emphasis in original).
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The generally accepted idea is that spouses are partners in the
marital economic enterprise, which encompasses all acquisitions
during marriage that result from the efforts of either spouse.
Premarital acquisitions, as well as gifts or inheritances received by
one spouse during marriage, are not considered part of this
economic partnership.
Some have begun to question this distinction. Various proposals
have recently been made that, particularly in marriages of
substantial duration, spouses at dissolution should share a portion or
all of what would normally be considered "separate property."
I will summarize these various proposals below and describe the
commentators' arguments why such a change would be desirable. I
will outline why I disagree and then offer other suggestions about
how sharing could be increased at divorce.
II. PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE RULES APPLICABLE AT DIVORCE BY
PARTIALLY OR FULLY TRANSMUTING SEPARATE PROPERTY INTO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A. Proposalsto Share Pre-marriageSavings
The American Law Institute (in the Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution) has proposed that, when determining what
property should be divided upon divorce, premarital "separate"
property should gradually become "marital" over time, once the
length of marriage exceeds the specified minimum duration.4 The
drafters argue that after many years of marriage, spouses "typically
do not think of their separate-property assets as separate," and "the
longer the marriage the more likely it is that the spouses will have
made decisions about their employment or the use of their marital
assets that are premised in part on . . . expectations [of having

access to] the separate property of both spouses." 5
In an example discussed in the body of this proposal, the
drafters envision a system where shared ownership would begin
after five years of marriage at an increment of four percent per year
thereafter. So, if a marriage ends in divorce after 20 years, 60% of
pre-marriage property would be treated as marital 6 (four percent
per year for the 15 years of marriage exceeding the five-year
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.12, (2002) [hereinafter

ALI PRINCIPLES]. The drafters note that this minimum duration should be at
least "two or three years" before any sharing should begin, and after "thirty or
thirty-five years" total sharing should occur. Id. cmt. b.
5. Id. cmt. a.
6. Id. cmt. b, illus. 1.
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mark).7 Under such an approach, 100% of pre-marriage property
would be treated as marital upon divorce after 30 years of
marriage.8 The ALI does give a court discretion not to app1y this
sharing doctrine if it would result in a substantial injustice. This
proposed regime of gradually sharing pre-marriage savings could
be avoided via a premarital agreement that would specify that the
parties do not wish to adopt that regime.10
Other commentators have also supported this ALI proposal to
gradually recharacterize pre-marriage savings for purposes of
determining what property should be shared at divorce. Professors
Frantz and Hagan argue that this approach is consistent with "the
moral imperative to share all one has with a loved one in financial
need" as well as "the fact that, over time, spouses feel less need
and less desire to guard against the possibility of divorce and
remarriage.""
Another commentator, like the ALI, contends that "spouses
tend to share more and more of their [separate] assets as the
marriage progresses."' 2 This commentator further proposes a
system of sharing premarital savings that would depend on the
length of the marriage and the age and life expectancy of the
owning spouse at the time the marriage begins. At divorce, a
portion of the pre-marriage savings would be marital; the marital
share would be calculated by comparing the duration of the
marriage at the time of divorce to the life expectancy of the owner
of the property when the marriage began. For a person age 30 at
the beginning of the marriage with a life expectancy of 50 years, if
the marriage ends in divorce after 10 years, the pre-marriage
savings would be considered 10/50 marital at divorce.1 In
contrast, if a person marries at age 60 with a life expectancy of 80
and divorces in 10 years, it would appear that, under this approach,
the premarital savings would be considered 10/20 marital. So,
7. It does not appear that the drafters are suggesting that in a community
property state, actual ownership during an intact marriage would gradually
change, but this is not clear.
8. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at § 4.12 cmt. b, illus. 5.
9. Id. at § 4.12(6).
10. See, e.g., id. at § 7.05(5). This section provides that most of the grounds
normally available for challenging the enforcement of a premarital agreement
under the ALI proposal would not be available to challenge the parties'
agreement not to share separate property.
11. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 75, 114 (2004).
12. Shari Motro, Labor, Luck and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of
Separate Property,102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1623, 1625 (2008).
13. Id. at 1653-54.
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unlike the ALI proposal, under this regime sharing would be
greater for spouses marrying later in life.
B. Proposalsto Share Gifts or InheritancesReceived During
Marriage
The same commentators also propose that gifts or inheritances
received by one spouse during marriage should not always be
considered totally separate property. Under the ALI proposal, the
amount of sharing is impacted by the point in time that the gift is
acquired. Even in a long marriage, no sharing occurs if the gift is
received shortly before the divorce.1 4 In contrast, there is more
sharing with respect to gifts received early in marriage. The
Reporters discuss what should occur if an inheritance is received in
the 10th year of marriage and the couple divorces 10 years later.
The proposed statute would allow sharing of 4% per year of
marriage, starting five years after receipt, plus 2% per year for the
time between five years of marriage and the date of receipt. The
above example results in sharing 20% (4% x 5) plus 10% (2% x 5),
or 30% of the gift.15
Under the ALI, a spouse can avoid the application of this
sharing regime by giving the other spouse written notice when the
gift or inheritance is received of a desire not to share.16 The sharing
regime may also be circumvented if the donor or testator expresses
a wish that the sharing regime not apply.1 7
Other commentators offer different mechanisms for sharing
gifts and inheritances received during marriage. 8 Professors Frantz
and Dagan would determine the marital character of a gift for
purposes of divorce by comparing the marital duration when the
gift is received to the length of the relationship between the donor
and donee at that time. So, if a spouse who is 52 years old receives
a gift after eight years of marriage from a parent, the gift would be
8/52 marital. So, in contrast to the ALI, there generally would be
greater sharing regarding gifts received later in the marriage.
In contrast, Professor Motro suggests that the marital claim
should be calculated by comparing the length of time between the
14. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 4.12, cmt. b, illus. 1 (suggesting
that the gift must have been received more than three years before divorce for
sharing to occur).
15. Id. illus. 2.
16. Id. at§ 4.12(4).
17. Id. at§ 4.12(5).
18. Again, this does not appear to be a claim of immediate ownership but is
merely how the property should be treated if the parties divorce.
19. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 11, at 118 n. 195.
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date of receipt and divorce to the recipient's life expectancy on the
date of receipt. So, if a spouse inherits property at age 38, with a
life expectancy of 80 years, and the parties divorce two years later,
2/42 of the gift should be marital.2 0 In contrast to the ALI proposal,
it appears that there would be sharing under these last two
proposals for gifts received shortly before divorce. In addition,
Professor Motro would not let the recipient unilaterally opt out of
sharing a gift or inheritance by giving the other spouse notice that
the recipient did not intend to share.2 1
III. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PROPOSAL REGARDING THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE'S FORCED SHARE
A committee was appointed in the late 1980s to revise the
"forced share" system to provide for a surviving spouse in
common law states. 22 When reevaluating the surviving spouse's
elective share in connection with the 1990 revisions to the Uniform
Probate Code, the drafters attempted to implement in a general
way the partnership theory of marriage. The drafters decided that,
unlike the previous version of the UPC, the survivor's claim
should vary based upon the duration of the marriage. However, the
drafters did not attempt to replicate the system applicable at
divorce in many states that distinguishes between "marital
property," which is shared, and "separate property," which is not.2 3
Among other things, the drafters concluded that it would
require too much time and effort to trace what was marital and
what was separate. 24 They argued that this result could roughly be
replicated by gradually treating more of the parties' property as
marital as the marriage endures.2 5 The 1990 UPC amendments

20. Motro, supra note 12, at 1654.
21. Id. at 1657.
22. For a general discussion of these "forced share" statutes, see J. Thomas
Oldham, You Can't Take It With You, and Maybe You Can't Even Give It Away,
41 U. MEM. L. REV. 95 (2010), and O'Brien, supra note 3.
23. See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our MultipleMarriage Society, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1992); O'Brien, supra
note 3, at 673 n.278.
24. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple Marriage Society and
Spousal Rights under the Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REv. 223, 247
(1991). Regarding tracing in general, see OLDHAM, supra note 3, at § 11.03[1],
and J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 219 (1989).
25. See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's
Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment (Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No.
208, 2010) [hereinafter Working Paper]. See also, Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
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provide for full sharing after 15 years; Prof. Waggoner, the
Reporter for the 1990 amendments, has more recently proposed
that this period be extended to 25 years.2 6
Under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code amendments, no
attempt is made to determine whether property was acquired
before or during marriage or by gift or inheritance. Indeed, Prof.
Waggoner argues it would be unfair to do this in situations where
one party segregated his or her separate property and the other did
not. He also contends that his proposed scheme is similar to what
would happen in a community property state where, in a long
marriage, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace any property in
existence at dissolution to pre-marriage savings or prior gifts or
inheritances. 28
Professor Newman has challenged these arguments by Professor
Waggoner.2 9
IV. COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS

A. The Expectations of the Spouses
Commentators have primarily focused on whether spouses
should share pre-marriage savings or gifts or inheritances at
divorce, as opposed to when a marriage continues until the spouse
dies.3 0 One of the main arguments in favor of recharacterizing
separate property as community property at divorce is that, over
time, spouses gradually treat all property of both spouses as family
resources; the distinction between "separate" and "community," it
is argued, withers away. But, is this true? The ALI proposal admits
there are no studies confirming this and simply relies on
assumptions about spouses' expectations.
If a party wants to share ownership of separate property with a
spouse, a few avenues are already available. The owning spouse
could add the other's name to the account or convey a 50% interest

Uniform ProbateCode's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U.

MICH.

J.L. REFORM 1 (2003).

26. See Waggoner, Working Paper, supra note 25, at 16 (discussing a
possible amendment to Uniform Probate Code § 2-202).
27. Id at 13.
28. Id at 13-14.
29. See Alan Newman, Incorporatingthe Partnership Theory, 49 EMORY
L.J. 487, 521-22 (2000).
30. For example, the ALI, Professors Frantz and Dagan, and Professor
Motro all focus on division of property at divorce.
31. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at § 4.12 cmt. a.
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to the spouse.32 Alternatively, if the property consists of liquid
assets3 the assets could gradually be commingled with marital
funds.3 In addition, the parties could sign a written agreement to
change the character of the property. If the party owning property
did none of these things and kept the property separate, is it clear
there was an intention to share?
When discussing an "intention to share," it also seems there
could be a variety of levels of intentions to share. One spouse may
be willing, for example, during an intact marriage, to use separate
property to pay for the other spouse's medical emergency if one
arises. But does that mean there is also an understanding that some
or all of the property will be shared if they break up?
It is possible that some spouses develop an expectation that all
resources owned by both spouses will be available for family
support in the future. But should such an expectation give rise to a
right to share in some or all of this property if the parties divorce?
It is possible that many spouses also have an "expectation" that
they will share in the other spouse's earnings for the remainder of
the spouse's career. Regardless of such an expectation, no U.S.
state would currently provide for equal sharing of post-divorce
income, even in a marriage of long duration.34
B. The Rationalefor Distinguishingbetween Separateand
Community Property
Professor Motro notes that acquisitions during marriage from
effort can be partially due to luck family connections, or
premarital experience or education.Y5 In addition, gifts or
inheritances might be received in part for services provided. 6
If a spouse has an express agreement that property will be
devised to him or her in consideration for services provided, the
devised property would be community property.3 7 But the
32. This would normally transmute the property into some form of shared
property. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 3, at § 11.01[2].
33. This would result in the commingled mass being treated as community
property. Id. at § l1.01[3].
34. Some commentators have proposed post-divorce income sharing for a
certain fraction of the duration of the marriage. See Cynthia Lee Starnes,
Mothers as Suckers, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1513, 1543 (2005); Jane Rutherford,
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 568-69 (1990);
sources cited in June Carbone, Back to the Future: The Perils and Promise of a
Backward-LookingJurisprudence,in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 209, 220 n.76
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
35. See Motro, supra note 12, at 1625, 1639.
36. Id. at 1638; Frantz& Dagan, supra note 11, at 117-118.
37. See Andrews v. Andrews, 199 P. 981 (Wash. 1921).
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"normal" inheritance will be considered separate property, even if
the inheriting spouse provided some services, and wages will be
community property, even if partially the result of luck, family
connections, or premarital experience or education. The fact that in
some instances there might be multiple factors influencing why a
spouse receives an inheritance or the level of his or her salary does
not prove that it is senseless to distinguish, as a general rule,
between acquisitions during marriage from effort and gifts or
inheritances.
Professor Motro has challenged this distinction. She has argued
[the community property system's] exclusive focus on
labor is inconsistent with what most Americans presume
marriage means.

...

Marriage is not fundamentally about

equal contribution of labor. It is about two people joining
the risks and rewards of their lives: merging their fates,
committing to be 'in the same boat,' to sink or swim
together.. . .Marital property law should look to spouses'
overall financial resources and require them to share these
resources.. 38
Despite Professor Motro's assertion about "what most
Americans presume marriage means," most commentators have
argued that the community property, labor-centered economic
partnership model reflects most people's understanding of
marriage and the appropriate level of sharing. 39 In addition, the
system of "community of acquests" accepted in the community
property states in the U.S. is the marital property regime most
commonly applied to spouses in many other countries. 40 The
system of "universal community property," where all property of
the spouses is shared, is the default regime only in the Netherlands,
where it has been the subject of significant criticisms.41
38. Motro, supra note 12, at 1627.
39. See Carbone,supra note 34, at 216 n.49.
40. See Charlotte Butruille-Cardew, A French Perspective on International
Prenuptialand PostnuptialAgreements, in INTERNATIONAL PRE-NUPTIAL AND
POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 127, 129 (David Salter, Charlotte ButruilleCardew & Stephen Grant eds., 2011) (discussing the default marital regime in
France); see generally FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE (Carolyn Hamilton & Alison
Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002) (summarizing the marital property law rules in various
European countries). In a non-community property jurisdiction such as England,
the division of premarital acquisitions or inheritances during marriage is
possible. See Philip Moor, Where Did Our Love Go: Recent Developments in
Ancillary Relief 41 FAM. LAW (U.K., Jan. 2011) at 34.
41. See generally Ian Sumner & Caroline Forder, The NetherlandsProposedRevision of MatrimonialProperty Law, a New Inheritance Law, and
the First Translation of the Dutch Civil Code, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY
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V. SHOULD SEPARATE PROPERTY GRADUALLY BECOME
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AS THE MARRIAGE CONTINUES?

A. The Expectation to Share
I am not persuaded that an additional mechanism is now
needed to transmute separate property into community property.
As mentioned above, parties now can transmute property via a
marital agreement, by adding the other spouse's name to title, or
by conveying an interest in the property to the other spouse. In
addition, liquid assets can be mixed with assets accumulated
during marriage. As a result of any of these actions, the nonowning spouse will acquire an interest in the property that formerly
was "separate" property. In all these instances, the owning spouse
has taken some action that reflects an intent to share.
If the owning spouse did none of these things to indicate an
intention to share, and kept the property separate, is it clear there
still was a mutual expectation to share separate property? I am not
convinced. And even if there was an expectation to share if the
marriagecontinued, should there be sharing if the marriage ends in
divorce?
A similar situation arises when one spouse supports the other
through graduate school, with the expectation of sharing the
enhanced earnings that will result from the professional training. In
almost all states, even though one spouse probably had an
"expectation" that he or she would share in the increased earnings
of the other spouse after graduation, if the spouses divorce shortly
after graduation, the spouse who supported the other while in
school does not share a substantial portion of the educated spouse's
post-divorce earnings.
As one court has stated:
The termination of a marriage represents, if nothing else, the
disappointment of expectations, financial and non-financial,
which were hoped to be achieved by and during the
continuation of the relationship. It does not, in our view,
represent a commercial investment loss.

. .

. If the plan fails

by reason of the termination of the marriage, we do not
regard the supporting spouse's consequent loss of
expectation by itself as any more compensable . . . than the

OF FAMILY LAW 337 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2004); see also Ian Curry-Sumner,
The Netherlands-PartyAutonomy and Responsibility, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 260 (Bill Atkin ed., 2008).
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loss of expectations of any other spouse who, in the hope
and anticipation of the endurance of the relationship ... has
invested a portion of his or her life ... in a failed marriage.42
Regardless of whether one spouse has an "expectation" to
share in the income of the educated spouse after that spouse
receives a professional degree, if a divorce occurs before
graduation or shortly thereafter, in almost all states the other
spouse is not entitled to share in the post-graduation income,
despite any expectations to the contrary.
B. A Comment about IncreasingSharingfor MarriedCouples
Some Western countries treat unmarried partners like spouses
if the relationship continues for a specified period.4 3 Others give
unmarried partners some rights if the partners break up, but not as
many rights as spouses.
In contrast, in most U.S. states, unmarried partners have no
status rights; they only have a claim when the relationship ends if a
generally recognized cause of action between unrelated third
parties can be established, based on principles of contract or
partnership, for example. 45 It is therefore not uncommon for an
unmarried partner to have no claim when the relationship ends.46
So, when a relationship ends, the rights of unmarried partners in
the U.S. currently are very different from spouses, regardless of the
length of the relationship or whether the parties have raised a child
together. This raises the question of whether current legal rules in
the U.S. encourage a party (at least the wealthier one) not to marry
if, as a result, the sharing that would otherwise result from
marriage could thereby be avoided, without the necessity of a
premarital agreement. A related question is whether any proposal
to increase sharing in marriage in any substantial new way would
create additional incentives to avoid marriage, as long as there are
so few status rights given to unmarried partners.

42. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062, 1070-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982).
43. See generally HARRY KRAUSE, LINDA ELROD, MARSHA GARRISON & J.
THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY LAw 255-256 (6th ed. 2007).
44. Id.
45. See OLDHAM, supra note 3, §§ 1.02[1], 1.02[5].
46. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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VI. INCREASING SHARING AT DIVORCE BY CHANGING COMMUNITY
PROPERTY RULES

I have noted elsewhere that community property states do not
agree regarding the rule to apply to determine the size of the
community estate. 47 If increased sharing at dissolution is the
desired goal, states could review their community property rules to
see if any should be changed to increase the size of the community
estate. For example, in some community property states income
from separate property is considered separate property.48 This
creates unfair results, particularly in the situations examined
below.
A. The Wage-EarnerMarriedto a Spouse with Inherited Wealth or
PremaritalSavings
Spouses can generate income in various ways. A spouse with
inherited wealth or pre-marriage savings can generate investment
income in the form of interest, dividends and rents. A spouse who
works outside the home generates income in the form of wages.
In some community property states, income from separate
property is separate. 49 Some commentators have challenged this
rule and proposed that all states accept that income from separate
property should be community.50 Otherwise, the spouse with
inherited wealth can accrue separate property income during
marriage, while the income of the wage-earning spouse is
community, which seems quite unfair.
B. The RetiredMarriedCouple
After retirement, people accrue pensions and investment
income. In community property states where income from separate
property remains separate, spouses who marry after retirement
could accrue little or no community property, even if the marriage
continues for a long period, and even if substantial investment
47. See Oldham, supra note 1.
48. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (West, Westlaw current through
the First Regular Session and Third Special Session of the 50th Legislature,
2011); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 770-71 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
123.130 (West, Westlaw current through the 26th Special Session of the Nevada
Legislature, 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8 (West, Westlaw current through
the First Regular Session of the 50th Legislature, 2011).
49. See statutes cited, supra note 48.
50. See Thomas R. Andrews, Income from Separate Property: Towards a
TheoreticalFoundation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1993).
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income is received. This would not be true, of course, if all states
adopted the rule that income from separate property is community
property.5 '
C. A Different Way to Increase Sharing: Change the Community
PropertyRules Applicable to Incomefrom SeparateProperty
Professor Andrews argues that community property states
adopted the rule that income from separate property during
marriage is separate property "more out of confusion or a
misguided attempt to protect wives than out of sound policy." 52 He
persuasively argues that the opposing rule, that income from
separate property is community, "captures the essential notion that
in the community property system, each spouse is expected to
dedicate the fruits of all of his or her capital, be it human or
nonhuman, to the community during marriage."5 3
So, one way of increasing sharing in a way consistent with
community property theory would be for all states to accept the
"Spanish Rule" that income from separate property is
community. 54 This would, among other things, help address the
problems mentioned above when parties marry after retirement, as
well as when one spouse's income comes from investment income
and the other's comes from wages.

VII. ANOTHER

WAY TO INCREASE SHARING AT DIVORCE-REVISE
SPOUSAL SUPPORT RULES

Some commentators have suggested that spouses should share
at divorce, at least in marriages of significant duration, premarriage savings and gifts or inheritances received during
marriage. I have questioned whether this would be a necessary or
sensible change in the basic system of community property. If the
basic goal is to increase sharing in marriage, is there any other
option?
51. Professor Motro has proposed that all natural enhancement of separate
property during marriage also should be shared. See Motro, supra note 12, at
1656. This would be like the "sharing of accruals" approach applicable in
Switzerland and Germany. See Anna Stepien-Sporek, Sharing ofAccruals as the
Best Solution for Marriage?, in FAMILY FINANCES 639 (Bea Verschraegen, ed.,
2009).
52. See Andrews, supra note 50, at 215.
53. Id.
54. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Need for Legislative Attention to
Separate-PropertyMarriages Under Community Property Law, 8 CAL. W. L.
REv. 381, 408 (1972).
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About two decades ago, many U.S. commentators made
various proposals to increase post-divorce income sharing.5 5
Numerous arguments justifying such sharing were made, including
the point that roles assumed during marriage can have a prolonged
negative impact on a person's career, and that it would be more
spouses to share those costs if they break up via
fair for former
- *
-56
post-divorce income sharing.
These proposals for much more robust post-divorce income
sharing have not yet been adopted to any significant degree in the
U.S., but they do seem to have had some impact. As Professor
Garrison has shown in her work, during the 1980s it was
increasingly common for post-divorce support, even in marriages of
longer duration, to be fixed-term rehabilitative support.57 Perhaps at
least due in part to scholarship advocating increased post-divorce
income sharing, more courts in the U.S. are now willing to award
indefinite support when a marriage of long duration ends in
divorce.s It should be emphasized, however, that most courts
fashioning such post-divorce awards in the U.S. do not attempt to

55. See Rutherford, supra note 34; Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989); Stephan Sugarman, Dividing
FinancialInterests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 136
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990); Ira M. Ellman, The
Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1989); Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital
Partnershipand the Casefor PermanentAlimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351 (1989); see
generally J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in 1990s, 80 CALIF. L. REV.
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equalize post-divorce living standards, and many commentators
continue to characterize the awards as inadequate.5 9
It is interesting to contrast the development of U.S. spousal
support rules during the past two decades with the Canadian
experience. Until the 1990s, Canadian spousal support rules were
quite similar to those in the U.S. 60 However, during the 1990s, the
Canadian Supreme Court announced two important decisions, Moge
v. Moge and Bracklow v. Bracklow,6 1 both of which announced
justifications for more frequent and more substantial spousal support
awards. 62 During this period, Canada adopted child support
guidelines, and the guidelines were perceived to work well. As
courts and lawyers struggled to implement the principles of Moge
and Bracklow, some wondered whether guidelines could be created
for spousal support as well. In 2005, a first draft of advisory spousal
support guidelines was proposed.6 4 From 2005 to 2008 the drafters
made minor adjustments to the guidelines, based on feedback
received. A "final" version was promulgated in 2008.65
Once a court has determined that the award of spousal support is
appropriate, the guidelines offer a way to compute the amount and
duration of support. For example, for a divorce not involving minor
children, the presumptive amount is 1.5-2% of the difference in the
spouses' respective gross incomes multiplied by the number of years
the parties were married, with a maximum of 50%.66 The duration is
one half to one year of support for each year of marriage, with a
presumption of indefinite support if the marriage lasted at least 20

59. See Oldham, supra note 56, at 438 n.127.
60. See Carol Rogerson, The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 FAM.
L.Q. 69, 78 (2004).
61. See Oldham, supra note 56, at 438-439.
62. In Canada, the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over
marriage and divorce, as well as the rules governing the right to post-divorce
spousal support. See Nicholas Bala, The Debates about Same-Sex Marriage in
Canadaand The UnitedStates, 20 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 195 (2006).
63. See Oldham, supra note 56, at 439.
64. See generally CAROL ROGERSON & ROLLIE THOMPSON, CAN. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SPOUSAL SUPPORT ADVISORY GUIDELINES: A DRAFT PROPOSAL (2005).
65. See CAN. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.family.justice.gc.ca (last visited
Aug. 17, 2011); Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines: Report on Revisions, 28 CAN. FAM. L. Q. 193 (2009).
66. See Rogerson & Thompson, supra note 65, at 197-198; Lonny L. Balbi,
Steps to Using the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: Without Child Support
Formula, 28 CAN. FAM. L. Q. 365, 366 (2009). The basic idea is that the recipient
should never receive more than 50% of the parties' net disposable income. See
Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: A
User's Guide to the Final Version, 28 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 209, 218 (2009).
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years. 67 Situations where deviation from the guidelines might be
669
is unlikely if the parties divorce
appropriate are set forth .' Support

after a short marriage and do not have children.69 An income floor
and ceiling are proposed; spousal support generally is not to be
awarded if the potential obligor's annual income is less than
$20,000 and the guidelines do not apply to annual income exceeding
$350,000.70 It is currently unclear how various events subsequent to
the divorce will impact the support order, such as an increase in the
obligor's income, the re-partnering of the recipient, or if the obligor
has additional children. 7 1
Although spousal support guidelines are not common in the U.S.
today, some U.S. states and counties have begun to apply guidelines
to spousal support.72 Although no consensus has yet been reached,
they all attempt to reduce levels of inequality in post-divorce income
while support is being paid. The presumptive support duration is a
function of the duration of the marriage. It would seem likely that
in those jurisdictions that are attempting to implement guidelines,
spousal support is being awarded more frequently than before the
guidelines were promulgated.
If greater sharing at divorce is desired in the U.S., perhaps the
avenue that offers the most opportunity is increased sharing
through reimagining spousal support, as opposed to transmuting
separate property into community property. Current rules in most
U.S. states give courts great discretion, which frequently leads to
arbitrary and unpredictable results. 75 Perhaps jurisdictions could
67. See Balbi, supra note 66. Indefinite does not mean permanent. See
Rogerson & Thompson, Report on Revisions, supra note 65, at 198. For
example, in Prof Thompson's survey of recent Ontario cases, of ten marriages
ending in divorce after 20 years of marriage or more, in nine of ten the support
was of indefinite duration. See Rollie Thompson, All Guidelines, All The Time:
Spousal Support in Ontario2009-2010, 29 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 201, 209 (2010). In
addition, for marriages that lasted at least five years, support is to be of
indefinite duration if the length of marriage and the age of the recipient when the
parties separated totaled 65. See Balbi, supra note 66, at 366.
68. See Rogerson & Thompson, supra note 65, at 204-207; Rogerson &
Thompson, supra note 66, at 230-235. See also, Carol Rogerson & Rollie
Thompson, The Canadian Experiment with Spousal Support Guidelines, 45
FAM. L. Q. (forthcoming 2011).
69. See Rogerson & Thompson, User's Guide, supra note 66, at 219.
70. Id. at 235-237.
71. Id. at 237-240.
72. See Oldham, supra note 56, at 443.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An
Empirical Analysis of DiscretionaryDecision Making, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 401,
481, 487, 489 (1996).
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mimic Canada and attempt to agree upon presumptive rules
regarding spousal support. At a minimum, this could provide more
certainty and predictability to post-divorce spousal support awards.
In addition, greater post-divorce income sharing seems a possible
outcome if spousal support guidelines would be more broadly
accepted in the U.S.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Some commentators have suggested that in marriages that
exceed a certain specified minimum duration and end in divorce, in
addition to the community property estate spouses should share a
portion or all of the spouses' separate property, with the amount of
sharing generally determined based on the marriage duration. I am
not persuaded that such a basic change in community property
rules is needed.
If the goal is to create a larger pot of divisible property at
divorce, a number of options exist. I have shown in a recent article
that, in a number of instances, community property states do not
agree on how to determine the amount of the community property
claim, and that the choice of the approach to be applied to
determine the community claim in each instance can significant
impact the amount of divisible property when the marriage ends.
One such issue mentioned above is how to characterize income
accruing during marriage from separate property. A number of
states consider such income to be separate property. There are
strong arguments that it would be more consistent with community
property theory to adopt the opposite rule, which is applied in
Texas and Louisiana; if that rule would be accepted in all states,
this would enlarge the pot of divisible property. In addition,
increased sharing at divorce could be accomplished by
reevaluating the various rules that govern how to calculate the
amount of community property claim in various other situations.
Another way to increase sharing at divorce would be to
reimagine spousal support, which has occurred during the past two
decades in Canada. Persuasive arguments have been made why, at
least in those instances where a spouse's career has been
permanently impacted by caring for the couple's children,
substantial post-divorce income sharing would be fair and
appropriate.

76. See Oldham, supra note 1.

